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1. Introduction: Main Features of the 
Israeli Economy 1/ 
Before submitting the description and analysis of Israel's 
export promotion policies, it may be worthwhile to provide a very 
brief background accounting of the most salient features and 
developments of the country's economy«. 
(i) Population and Immigration. Israel was established as 
an independent state in May 19^8. At the end of 19^8, the population 
in the area which eventually constituted'the state of Israel was 
roughly 900,000, consisting of about 750,000 Jews and 150,000 Arabs 
and other minorities. By the end of 1972, the population had reached 
about 3°2 million, of which over 2.7 million were Jews and close to 
half a million Arabs. This is an increase of more than 250 oer cent over 
this period of twenty-four years9 or an average annual rate of increase 
population of about 5-5 per cent, undoubtedly one of the highest rates 
of increase of population to be found in the modern world. 
However, the rate of increase of population was far from 
uniform. The increase in the Arab population was determined<almost 
entirely by the rate of natural increase, which was rather stable 
over the years (being, incidentally, the highest recorded rate in 
the world during the last generation). By contrast, for the Jewish 
population, who are the majority, less than one-third of the increase 
in population over the period as a whole is the result of natural 
increase: over two-thirds is accounted for by (net) immigration, 
the size of which has varied widely over the period. A sharp 
distinction must be made between the period of 3 1/2 years from 
1/ This paper draws heavily on my NBER study Foreign Trade Regimes 
and Economic Development: Israel, New York:, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 1975« Paragraphs from the book are often 
incorporated in the paper verbatim. The book will be referred 
.. to in the paper as "Michaely (1975)"« :, 
Besides summarizing the main findings of the book on the 
subject of export policies," the present paper extends the study 
to the recent years 1972-1975» 
/May 19^8 
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May 19^8 to the end of 1951 and the rest of the period. In the 
second half of 19^8 immigration amounted to about 100,000; in 19̂ -9, 
to 2^0,000; in 1950, to 170,000; and in 1951, to 175,000. Over this 
period of about 3 1/2 years immigration thus amounted to roughly 
700,000 people, more than the entire Jewish population in Israel 
in mid-19^8. By the end of 1951, the total population of the 
country was almost double its size of three years earlier. Then an 
abrupt change took place, largely because the main sources of 
immigration were exhausted, but to some extent also due to establishment 
of a policy of selectivity in financing the transfer of immigrants. 
In 1952 immigration tumbled to less than 25,000; and in 1953 it was 
only ll,000o Since then, annual immigration has fluctuated mostly 
within a range of about 20,000 to 60,000 people. Consequently, the 
average annual rate of increase of population between 1951 and 1972 
was less than 3.1/2.per cent, in contrast to an average rate of over 
20 per cent during 19^9-1951° Very roughly, thè increase in Jewish 
population from 1952 on was provided for in equal shares by 
immigration and natural increase. 
(ii) National Product. Gross national product in 1950, the 
earliest year for which estimates for the Israeli economy are 
available, was about IL 460 million (in 1950 prices). With an 
average population of 1.27 million in that year, the per capita 
annual product is about IL 370. At the formal rate of exchange of 
that year (IL 0.357 per dollar) this would be approximately $1,000. 
There is no doubt, however, but that use of the 1950 formal rate of" 
exchange for international comparisons grossly exaggerates the size 
of Israel's product. Thus, although estimates of per capita national 
product at constant prices show a substantial increase from 1950 to 
195^, the application of the 195^ formal rate (IL 1.80 per dollar) 
to the 195^ data on product and population would yield a per capita 
product of only about $570 per year. It appears that, for 
comparative purposes, per capita annual product in Israel around the 
time of its establishment was roughly $^00 to $500. By this criterion 
/Israel at 
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Israel at that time would probably be classified as being in the 
border zone between developed and underdeveloped economies - in the 
same range, say, as the higher-income countries in Latin America. 
From 1950 to 1970, the GNP increased (at constant prices) by 
615 per cent - over sevenfold - an average annual rate of increase 
of about 10 1/2 per cent. This is a raté rarely equaled Or surpassed 
by any other economy during the las't generation, Japan being the only 
other case which comes to mind. Part of this spectacular increase 
in the national product is, of bourse, due to the unusually large 
increase of the population and labour forcé. But even per capita 
GNP tripled between 1950 and 1971V at an ¡average annual rate of 
increase of about 5.8 per cent, which is again outstanding (although 
not a rare exception) by current intèrnatióhal standards. For 
international comparisons," again, per capita annual product in 
1970 could be roughly'estimated as being' $1,500; that is, about the 
middle of the range of countries that would be normally classified 
as "developed". ' ' 
(iii) Foreign Trade and Capital Imports'. Israel has always 
had a large import surplus. In the first few years after its 
establishment,' the ratio of Israel's exports to its imports was 
extremely low: in 19^9 and Ì950 exports of goods and services were 
only about 15 per cent as large as imports. This ratio increased 
gradually, particularly during the 1950s, with many fluctuations 
along the upward trend. By the late 1950s or early 1960s the ratio 
of exports to imports was roughly;50 per èent; and by the end of 
the 1960s it waë fluctuating around 60 per cent. The increase of 
this ratio kept pace, however,- with the increase in total imports; 
and the absolute size of the import surplus thus kept rising, although 
not monotonically. The annual import surplus (of both goods and 
services) was about $300 million in the late 19̂ +Os and early 1950s 
and, with fluctuations, remained around this level until I960;» 
During the 1960s, on the other hand, the import surplus rose 
substantially, especially with the increase in imports of military 
goods following thè Six-Day War of 1967: ih thè mid-1960s the import 
/surplus fluctuated 
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surplus fluctuated around $500 million, and in the early 1970s it 
was about $1,200 million. In the last few years the import surplus 
increased again very substantially, as a combined reèult of the 
increase in demand for military imports following the war of 
October 1973, the increase in world prices and the worsening of the 
country's terms of trade in the process (particularly owing to the 
increase in the price of oil). In 1975, the import surplus amounted 
to approximately $4 billion. 
Over the period as a whole, autonomous capital inflow from 
abroad, including both unilateral transfers and long-term borrowing, 
was roughly equal to the import surplus. This does not mean, of 
course, that the two were équal in any given short period: year-to-
year fluctuations in the (positive or négative) gap between the two 
were considerable. On this score, â' few sub-periods may be clearly 
distinguished. From 1949 to 1951, foreign-exchange reserves were 
drawn upon extensively and virtually" disappeared; they began' to 
recover in 1954, and increased substantially between 1958 and 1967= 
Between the end of 1967 and early 1970 reserves- declined sharply. 
The trend was reversed again in mid-1970, with a substantial 
accumulation of reserves in 1971 and 1972. Finally, réserves have 
declined sharply since the end of 1973 (although since the end of 
1974 this decline has been partly disguised, showing itself not mainly 
as a reduction of gross reserves but as an increase in short-term 
indebtedness to foreigners). 
The importance of the various sources of capital imports varied 
over the years. The most important, and most permanent, single 
source was contributions from abroad (primarily from the Jewish 
community in" the United States) to Israeli institutions, mainly the 
Jewish Agency. Since 1951, the Jewish community abroad - again, 
primarily in the United States - has also provided capital by 
purchasing issues of a special governmental loan, termed first the 
"Independence Lokn" and then the "Development Loan". In the early 1950s 
the United States government was a relatively important source through 
two Export-Import Bank loans. Since 1970 it has again become 
/important through 
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important through large-scale lending primarily for military purchases* 
This has become particularly significant in most recent years, 
during which United States aid (by way of grants or long-term loans) 
has financed roughly a half of Israel's import surplus. The German 
government has been another major source«. First came the 
reparations agreement, by which the German government paid the 
Israeli government about $800 trillion during the period 1953-1963; 
since 195^, Germany has also been making restitution payments to 
individuals in Israel, the annual amount of which has been rising 
continuously. Other important sourcès of capital imports have been 
private unilateral transfers, both gifts and transfers of capital 
by immigrants; and diréct investment from abroad, which was 
substantial mainly in thé first half'of-the 1960s and again in the 
early 1970s. 
The ratio of value added in exports to the economy's total 
value added, its gross national product, is a rough indication of 
the share of the country's productive resources involved in production 
for exports. This ratio, valued in 1955 prices, was at first 
negligible: in the first half of the 1950s, it fluctuated around a 
level of 5 peir cent. From then on, a rising trend is clearly 
visible: in the early 1960s the ratio was about 10 per cent,and by 
the early 1970s it approached 15 per cent. With time, then, a 
significant share of the national economy was accounted for by 
exports, although even in recent years that share has been less 
important than in other small economies. 
The growth of exports was accompanied by a considerable change 
in their structure. In the early 1950s almost half of total exports 
of goods consisted of citrus fruits (mainly oranges). This category 
had a predominant share indeed of total exports when measured in 
terms of value added (the share of value added in total Value of 
citrus fruits is particularly high - about 70 to 75 per cent). Of 
the rest, mostly industrial exports, about half were polished diamonds, 
in which the value added is only about 20 per cent of total value. 
Thus, all other industries accounted for only *about one-quarter of 
/total exports 
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total exports of goods (slightly less in terms of value added). 
Exports of services were at that time negligible. Since then, a few 
strong trends appear in the development of exports. ; The share of 
citrus fruits has fallen sharply, amounting in recent years to only 
about 12 per cent of the gross value of exports of goods or about 
one-fifth of value added. The share of polished diamonds has been 
roughly maintained, amounting to about a quarter of the gross value 
of exports of goods but less than 10 per cent of value added. In 
recent years, two-thirds of exports (in both gross and value-added 
terms), compared with a mere one-quarter in the early 1950s, have 
consisted of an assortment of industrial goods and some agricultural 
products other than citrus fruits, chief among the former being •:• 
textile products, chemicals, and metal products. 
(iv) The Inflationary Process. Inflation has been a permanent 
attribute of the.Israeli economy, although the rate has varied 
substantially. The increase in the consumer price index^between 
1949 and 1975 was about 1,650 per cent,- an average annual rate of close 
to 12 per cent. The implied GNP price deflator rose even slightly 
more. , ; 
The. inflationary ,for,ceq were strongest from 194? to 1951, the 
first few years after the establishment of the state. But during 
this period inflation was severely suppressed. Consequently, 
inflationary pressure.was only partially reflected in official prices. 
During the period 1952-195-4 the process was reversed. The basic 
sources of inflation were eliminated. Had price movements not been ; 
repressed earlier, price increases in this period would have been 
very small. In fact, however, prices were freed during, this period, 
with the result that movements of the official prices reflected the 
preceding inflationary pressure, and with the further result of a 
closing (from both ends) of almost the entire gap between official 
and black-market prices. The increase in.the official consumer 
price index from the 1951' to the 195^ average was 127 per cent (in 
1952 alone, it increased by 58 per cent!). Since 1954, prices have 
been relatively,,.free, and recorded price changes have probably 
reflected, by and large, the extent of inflationary pressures. 
/During the 
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During the period 1955-1961, inflation was relatively modest. 
Consumer prices rose somewhat less than 5 per cent per year on the 
average (the record low being achieved in 1959, when prices increased 
by only about 2 per cent). From then on until 1965, inflation 
accelerated again: the average annual change in consumer prices 
between 1961 and 1965 was somewhat over 7 per cent. 
By the fall of 1965, the inflationary trend was reversed, and 
Israel's only severe recession started. At first, prices kept 
increasing. Indeed, consumer prices increased by about 6 per cent 
during the first half of 1966, when all the phenomena of recession 
were already obvious. But from then on, prices stabilized: from 
mid-1966 to the end of 1968 the increase in the consumer price index 
was less than k per cent (it was nil during Ì967, the only year 
with complete price stability in Israel's history). 
While the turning point toward renewed expansion probably came 
in early 1967, prices started to increase again- only in early 1969, 
when the recessionary slack was exhausted. At first, these price's 
increases were mild: the average annual change in the consumer price 
level from 1968 to 1970 was less than *+.5 per cent. But beginning 
in the fall of 1970, inflation assumed very substantial proportions. 
The inflationary pace has been particularly fast since the middle of 
1972. From 1971 to 1975» consumer prices increased by about 
165 per cent - an average annual increase of 27 per cent. The annual 
average price levels increased in 197^ and in 1975 by about per 
cent in each year. During 1976, prices have also been rising at an 
annual rate of some 35 per cent. 
(v) Controls and Liberalization. Except in the very early 
years, Israel's trade and payments policy has developed progressively 
from restriction to liberalization. 
Palestine, Israel's predecessor, was expelled from the sterling 
area during Israel's War of Independence. Consequently the country's 
sterling assets became frozen. In addition, exports declined 
radically as the fighting spread: citrus plantations, the country's 
main export source, could not be cultivated for thè most part, nor 
/could the 
could the fruit be exported. The demand for imports, on the other 
hand, was particularly heavy, due both to the requirements of the 
war and to the wave of mass immigration which started immediately. 
Foreign-exchange control thus became much more restrictive as soon 
as Israel was established. 
During the period from the establishment of the state to the 
end of 1951 controls become rapidly more stringent. The foreign-
exchange control system was the vital component and focal point of 
the system of repressed inflation. The foreign-exchange rate was 
kept fixed all this time'(aside from a.slight adjustment in 
September 19^9, when the pound sterling was devalued). With the 
accumulation of inflationary pressures,.the gap between the actual 
rate and its equilibrium level kept growing, and imports approved 
under the licensing system as a proportion of the demand for imports 
kept falling. 
As the degree ,of disequilibrium in the system grew, and rationing 
became more severe and more inclusive, the system started to 
deteriorate. Black markets became widespread, and production of 
various goods was often stopped for lack of imported raw materials. 
Foreign-exchange reserves were completely exhausted. Discontent with 
the economic policy gradually became widespread. The faith of the 
leaders of economic policy in the potential of intervention by the 
state and in;the feasibility of directing the economy by orders 
weakened,, as did their mistrust of the price mechanism. In 1951, it 
became obvious that a change in policy was due.,: This change came 
first in the summer and fall of 1951, with a shift from an expansive 
to a restrictive monetary-fiscal policy. But the major part of the 
switch came in February 1952 with the declaration of the ''New Economic 
Policy". 
The most important element of this policy was a process of 
gradual but rapid devaluation. Within less than three years, the 
rate of exchange rose fivefold, compared with only about a doubling 
of domestic prices during the same period. This, together with the 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, resulted in a gradual reduction 
/in the 
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in the degree of disequilibrium in the system. By the end of 195^ 
the rate of exchange was roughly in equilibrium. Likewise, as has 
been mentioned earlier, domestic prices were allowed to rise. 
Consequently, rationing became gradually less severe, black markets 
became less widespread, and black-market prices and official prices 
moved closer to each other.- Although by the end of 195^ foreign-
exchange reserves were still very small, , the balance-of-payments 
position with the new rate of exchange ceased to be the major, basis 
for trade and payments restrictions.: 
From then on, import restrictions:have become consistently 
less severe. First, the control system changed from one intended 
to regulate the balance-of-payments position into one intended 
primarily to protect local production. There was a rapid de facto 
liberalization of imports'Of raw materials of which' local production 
was not feasible, although licenses were still required. - Such 
products made up the greater part of total, imports, owing partly 
to the control system itself. Imports of final consumer goods, 
on the other hand, were practically prohibited in almost all 
instances in which domestic production either was actually taking 
place or was contemplated by a potential entrepreneur. Policy towards 
imports of investment, goods sometimes had to face conflicts of. : 
interest arising when the encouragement of local production of a 
particular.investment good handicapped another.branch of local 
production which;required the use of that good. In effect, imports 
of most investment goods were-also liberalized, but not to the same 
extent as raw materials. • 
In February 1962 another "New Economic Policy'1 was announced.. 
One of its major ingredients was a declaration of. intention to 
liberalize the imports of consumer goods (and some investment goods) 
which until then were excluded by quantitative restrictions ,(QRs).. 
Procedures were set up to carry out this process. Most of this 
liberalization took the form of replacing the QRs by tariffs, at 
different rates for each good, which were .intended to be approximately 
prohibitive - though some (relative) increase of liberalized imports 
/did take 
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did take place. The work of the liberalization machinery ended in 
1968, and the process was supposed then to be completed. 
By 1969, almost all imports were liberalized in the sense of 
not being subject to effective quantitative restrictions (although 
licenses were still required). The declared policy, since that 
time, has been gradually to lower the level of protection afforded 
by the tariff system by reducing all tariffs by a given (small) 
proportion at the beginning of each year. Such reductions have 
indeed been performed, and their cumulative effect has been a 
significant lowering of protective rates. 
2. Formal Devaluations 
As a means of changing the effective exchange rate for exports 
(as well as for imports), changes in the formal rate of exchange have 
always constituted a major element of the system. It would be thus . 
appropriate to start with a brief survey of Israel's history of 
formal devaluations. 
When the state of Israel was established, the Israeli pound 
(introduced as legal tender in August 1948) was on a.par with the 
pound sterling. But a broken cross-rate with the United States 
dollar (as well as a few other "hard" currencies.of that period) 
was created: while the sterling's<exchange rate was about .250 pounds 
sterling.per dollar (4 dollars per pound), the Israeli pound's rate 
was fixed at .333 per dollar (3 dollars per pound). With the 
British devaluation of September 19^9 a minor devaluation of the 
Israeli pound straightened this out: the Israeli pound remained on 
par with sterling, and the rate of exchange with the dollar was 
made equal to that of sterling - IL .357 per dollar ($2.80 per pound). 
Since then, the rate of exchange of the Israeli pound was always 
determined and expressed as the price of the United States dollar 
- a practice that has been broken only most recently: since 
19 July 1976, the rate is determined as the price of a "basket" of 
/five major 
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five major currencies (the United States dollar, the British pound, 
the German mark, the French franc, and-the Dutch guilder), rather 
than as the price of the dollar alone. ' 
The first major devaluation was undertaken in February 1952. 
A multiple formal exchange-rate system was then introduced, with 
three rates. The rate of .357 JL per pound was still maintained 
as the official rate, but with only few transactions conducted at 
this rate; whereas most transactions were conducted at either twice 
the official rate - IL .?lVper'. dollar; or at the rate of IL 1 per 
dollar. In April 1953 a still higher rate was added, of,1.800 per 
dollar-« Transactions were gradually shifted from lower to/higher 
rates, and by mid-195^ the rate of IL 1,800 per dollar applied.to 
the large majority of transactions. It was declared as the official 
rate in July 1955» Thus^ within a period of about.3 years a formal 
fivefold increase of the rate of exchange (from .357 to 1.8 pounds 
per dollar) took place. 
The next devaluation was undertaken-in February 1962, when the 
rate of exchange was increased from 1.80 to 3«00 pounds per dollar. 
That rate was maintained for close to 6 years - until November 1967» 
when the Israeli pound was devalued by the same proportion (close to 
17 per cent-) as the British pound:- from 3°00 to 3-50 IL per dollar. 
In August 1971 the rate was increased further by 20 per cent to 
IL ̂ .20 per dollar; and in November 197^ a- formal devaluation of 
about kj> per; cent was undertaken, increasing the rate of exchange 
from *t-.20 to 6 pounds per dollar. 
In June 1975 the* system was changed from that of a fixed rate 
to a crawling-peg'scheme. The rate became subject to monthly / 
changes, not exceeding 2 per- cent each. As a result of such 
increases, as well as of a-10 per cent increase undertaken in 
September 1975 beyond the crawling-peg scheme, the exchange rate 
has risen from 6 pounds per dollar in June 1975 to 8.12 pounds per 
dollar in mid-July 1976. Finally, as was mentioned before, a change 
introduced in July 1976 made the rate of exchange fixed not in terms 
of United States dollars but of a "basket" of several major currencies. 
'. /Likewise, the 
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Likewise, the crawling-peg scheme has at that time been slightly 
modified, making the rate subject not necessarily to monthly changes 
but to a series of changes not exceeding 2 per cent each and totalling 
to no more than 8 per cent within periods of k months each. 
3» Export-Promotion Schemes 
Schemes of export promotion may be classified to, first,, those 
which in one way or another are related to the size-of exports and 
which may, in principle at least, be quantified >by the exporter (as 
well as by others);. and, second, to those which are related in a 
more vague way tô .export activity, .and which may be expected to 
contribute to export expansion but to an indeterminate extent. I 
shall discuss here mainly the better-define.d schemes of the first 
category, making only cursory, remarks about the rest. The former 
category of export-expansion instruments may again be sub-divided 
into four groups: subsidies to output: subsidies to inputs; subsidies 
to exports through, import-entitlement programmes; and "branch ,funds", 
which combine elements of- the three other measures. 
Ci) Subsidies to- Output. Such subsidies have traditionally 
been termed export "premiums" in Israel, and will be referred to 
here by this term. In one form or another, export premiums have 
existed -in Israel almost throughout - with .the exception, perhaps, 
of the years -1962-1965, when they were confined to a few individual 
cases. f 
Until 1956, export premiums, were given in a largely-haphazard 
and varying manner.. Starting in December 19^9, premiums were granted 
on many export goods, mostly at a rate of 10 to 12 per cent of the 
total value of exports. In May 1950, this was changed so that 
premiums were granted on*value added in exports, rather than on the 
total value. . With the formal devaluation of February 195.2,; these 
premiums were discontinued; some special premiums granted from then 
/until 1955 
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until 1955 were usually intended to solve specific problems involved 
in the process of transition from lower to higher formal rates of 
ex9hange.2/ ».••:. 
In the period 1956-1961 premium arrangements reached an apogee, 
and a nearly "classic" use of this device was demonstrated. This era 
started in February 1956, when a premium of IL 0.50 per dollar of 
value added in exports was introduced. The distinctive features of 
this arrangement were,'first, its widespread application: it was 
presumably universal and. uniform,, although it excluded the two ,: 
largest "traditional" export industries* citrus fruits and polished 
diamonds 3/ (as well aSfifcxports.of services); and second, its 
determination on the«basis of value added, rather than total value. 
Under this plan, an exporter would be granted a rate of.IL 1.80 per 
dollar (the formal rate) plus the¿premium (that is, a total of 
IL 2.30 per dollar when the plan was introduced) for,the net value 
add^d in the economy, whether it was value added by his own production or 
in other local firms. The import component, on the other hand- again, 
whether it was inputs imported directly for his own production (the 
direct component) or imports involved in inputs bought from other 
local firms (the indirect import component) - would be granted only, 
the formal rate of IL 1;80 per dollar.. This was the rate at which 
the exporter also bought,imported .inputs, after taking into, account 
the "drawback" plan,; which freed imports for exports from import 
duties (although the indirect import component introduced a few 
2/ For instance., the season for exports, of citrus fruits runs from 
October to May. Most exporters were benefitted by the shift of 
the rate from ..IL 1-.00- to IL l.SO.fcer dollar in May 1953- . To 
compensate citrus exporters for the subsidy forgone after May, 
they were granted a special premium of IL 0.136 per dollar during 
the 1953-195*+ season. 
3/ Diamonds were, in fact, subject to the universal premium 
arrangement. But mainly because of the. possibility of negative 
reactions of other, countries involved in this industry, the 
premium was disguised by other schemes. Exports of citrus 
fruits were also granted a premium for value added, but at a 
much lower rate. Gradually this rate approached the general 




complications on this score). While in principle the value added 
under this plan was supposedly calculated for each individual exporter,-
it was, in effect, calculated only for export'industries as a whole, 
and was recalculated for each industry, if at all, only, at long 
intervals. 
Besides the general premium plan outlined above,, a few other 
premium arrangements, existed during the period 1956-1961» Some of 
these v/ere in effect, confined, to specific export industries and did 
not amount, in the aggregate, to any substantial sum. In addition, 
however, a general plan of specific premium rates for "marginal" :  .x. 
exports went into, effect in early 1959« The intent, of the plan was 
to raise premiums, without., adding a rent element by paying higher 
premiums only for increases of exports. Generally, this meant an 
increase over the 1958 level of exports of a whole industry;kj but 
the committee that determined premium rates, for e;ach, industry 
interpreted this principle in a- variety of other ways. Most often,, 
the "marginal" premium rate was IL 1.20. per dollar of value added,, 
instead of the general premium rate of IL 0.85 per. dollar effective-
at that time; that is, there was an added premium of IL 0.35 per 
dollar above the general premium rate. 
With the formal devaluation of February 1962, both the general.:5 
premium arrangement and most .of the specific ones were abolished. 
The most important exceptions were premiums for exports of. the textile 
industry, a branch which had also enjoyed favourable treatment, prior 
to the devaluation. In this industry, a substantial premium, partly 
carried out through a "branch fund", remained in effect. In a few 
other export industries, too, "branch funds" - which.will be described 
later - provided subsidies, although oh a smaller scale. But for the 
large majority of Israel's exports, premium elements after the 
kj In all the cases involved in the actual application of the plan, 
no concern was expressed about distinctions'between an industry 
and the individual firms included in it. This was because 
individual industries consisted either of a single firm - a 
fairly common phenomenon at that time- or were organized under 
some cartel agreement. 
/devaluation became 
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devaluation became nil or» insignificant.. This remained true 'for 
over four years. Only in early-1966. was a,premium, plani reintroduced, 
in a manner which has remained, in. force-.ever since« ,<•,. 
.This plan, which-, was. established; in, April. .1966 ̂  has been 
disguised by ; the name '.'rebates of indirect taxes" but has nothing 
to do with those or any other taxes. Unlike in the premium plan of 
1956-1961, premiums in the current one are specified for the total 
rather than the added value of expQrts.: The. premium.rate varies, 
however, according to, the ratio-of.-.value;,-added in,-the industry, • 
with all industries grouped into particular classes according to 
average value-added, ratios.:, the lower th^, value-added ratio of the 
cl ass, the lower the premium^rate, granted; to exports of industries 
in that class. It , will be rgc;alled3that 'under :the . premium-for-value-
added plan of 1956-1961ratios-of value added;.were also ordinarily 
calculated for a. .wbole. indus try, an,d usually np.t .recalculated 
periodically., ; The differ^nçe between the two : plans is thus ,not as . 
radical as it may:>se.em, - and consists mainly ; in ̂  reduction of .?$he 1 
number of "classes" .of ..industries-from several hundred to just a few, 
thus, discriminating, in ,favour of, the -low-value-added industry^and' 
against, the high^value-;̂ dded. industry ;Within each.class« •.•.•< «. . 
•The premium-ra.tes -involved in,..the '-plan'-were changed quite -
. often. , Jiost :changes were .-.upw.ard;, but formal .devaluations (prior to 
the. introduction of the crawling-peg scheme-in mi.d-1975̂  vere. 
accompanied. by downward' changes -in the premiums to mçtkç. changes in . 
the effective exchange .rate for exporta smaller than-what they would 
-be due to the formal devaluations:alone. - With the establishment of ; 
the crawling .peg, premiums ,were .first kept stable, at their absolute. • 
level of pounds per dollar. With a gradually rising formal, exchange 
rate this.meant, of course, a-gradually declining rate of subsidization 
of exports by the premium scheme. This, was changed in early 1.976, 
when the government decided to restore . the-.rate of .subsidization to 
what it had been^before .the crawling peg; and to - keep the rate at 
that, given level, in the :futurer by raising the absolute level o.f : 
export premiums in proportion with the continuous increases in the 
formal rate of exchange. 
/The premium 
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The premium scheme has been used in recent years also as a 
partial substitute for a rebate, or drawback, of duty payments for 
the import component in exports. Throughout the years, imported 
inputs for export production have been free from tariff duties, by 
a drawback scheme. In August 1970, however, a general levy of 20;per 
cent was imposed on all imports; the rate of this levy has been 
changed on several occasions, fluctuating within the range of 
15-35 per cent (it has been 15 per cent during 1976). Unlike other 
tariff duties, imported inputs1 for exports have not been exempted 
from this levy. But the rate of export' premiums has been determined, 
since August 1970, at lèvèls which take into account the need to 
offset the levy duty on the import component. 
Table 1 presents the levels of subsidy granted by the export 
premium scheme since its re-introduction in 1966. It shows, in 
column (l), the "gross" premium rate- for èxpoits which are classified 
as having a value-added rate exceeding 55 per cent. These consist 
actually of two "value-added categories" - of 56-65 per cent and of 
66 per cént and above; but the 'subsidy -ra:tes of the two groups are 
quite similar, and a simplè average of the two is shown. Column (2) 
shows the rate of the import levy ón the import component in exports 
- namely, the rate of the universal levy introduced in 1970. In 
column (3) the subsidy rate for value-added in exports is shown. This 
is calculated by assuming an average value-added ratio of 60 per cent 
- obviously an arbitrary assùmptioh (besides .being applied to an 
average)/ but one which from circumstantial evidence seems to be hot 
too misleading. Finally, column (5) shows the subsidy to value added 
as a relative sizè òf the fórma! rate of exchange, which is presented 
in column (4). " ••"••"• 
(il) Premiums; on Inputs. Host premiums in this category were 
relatively unimportant. Thè only instance of à significant subBidy 
on a specific input was for fuel Used in the cement industry, where 
it is an important cost element. Once in a while¿ transportation 
costs, either local (by train) or on international routes (by sea) 
/weré subsidized, 
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were subsidized., usually through low rate quotati6ns; by goverataent-
owned shipping companies. Another instance of a transportation 
subsidy is the exemption of export shipments from the major part of 
port duès: these shipments aire charged only one-fourth of 1 per cent 
of the value of the shipment, whereas import shipments are charged 
2 per cent, the- actual cost of producing the services for which dues 
are levied lying probably somewhere between the two rates. 
The only important widespread subsidy of an ihput was the plan 
for-providing cheap short-term financing-'-for exports; that is, 
providing a-subsidy to help defray the cost of interest on short-
term capital loans."- Facilities of one kind or another existed 
during the 1950s; but a general, almost universal, plan was established 
in 1962, and with only minor modifications has remained in effect 
to this day. In this setup, short-term financing for industrial 
exports is provided (from funds tb which both the Bank of Israel 
and the commercial banks cohtribûté') under three headings: for value 
added; for the import component; and for the: time lag between 
shipment and receipt of money (that is,¿short-term credits provided 
by the Israeli exporter to; his customers). Financing for Value 
added" is quoted in Israeli currency; whereas financing "for the 
other two purposes is quoted in foreign Currency. The rate of 
interest charged on this credit has been mostly 6 per cent. For 
credit quoted in foreign exchange, this amounted on the average to 
only a small subsidy, since thé borrower (i.e., the exporter) has 
to carry the risk of a'dévaluation. Indeed, the scheme has 
fluctuated widely in accordance with the statè of expectations of 
devaluation. Financing of value added* on the other hand, which-' 
is denominated in local currency, has amounted to a very substantial 
subsidy on thé use of capital. The charge of 6 per cent being 
constant, the rate of this subsidization varies, of course, with 
changes in the market rate of interest, which is closely associated 
with changes in the rate of price increases. 
The amount of credit from this source to which an exporter is 
entitled depends not only,"of coursé, on the size of his exports but 
/also on 
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also on the length of- the "production ¡cycle"-, which is determined 
separately for each*industry. It.may well be the case that 
production cycles are generally longer in these calculations than 
is actually warranted by.the production process. Moreover, financing 
is provided in a lump sum for the wholé length of the cycle as 
calculated even though costs actually accumulate during the, cycle 
rather than being all incurred at its inception. It may thus be 
assumed that short-term financing from the export funds covers more 
than the full extent of credit actually required-and~probably very 
often by a considerable margin; the excess credit is used, of course, 
in the exporter's other operations, namely, for production for the 
local market. 
The combination of the ample size of this credit and the 
highly favourable interest rate on it makes the subsidy element 
involved in this scheme a significant factor. From 1962 to 1966, 
when no general premium arrangement was in force, this was actually 
the main subsidization element granted to exports, although it's size 
was obviously much lower than that which was provided by the direct 
premium schemes for output. It has been estimated - albeit,- by the 
use of arbitrary assumptions about interest rate- differentials - that 
subsidies-provided through credit from export funds amounted in: 
1966, for instance, to roughly 8 per cent-of the effective rate of 
exchange for value added (that is, about IL 0.3 per dollar)- in exports 
of diamonds, and 3 per cent in other industrial exports. In later 
years, these rates have risen, since (with accelerated price rises-
in the economy) non-subsidized interest rates1 increased. By way of 
illustration: during the first half of 1976,. the average level of 
credit granted to the financing of value added in chiefly industrial 
exports (excluding diamonds) was approximately IL 1,-600 millions 
(besides other financing provided for imported.inputs and for, the 
shipment of exports). The free-market rate of interest in bank 
loans was, at that time, roughly 35 per cent - exceeding by some 
30 per cent the subsidized rate of interest of the export credits. 
This would imply a subsidy of roughly 450-500 IL millions per year. 
/At the 
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At the same period, industrial exports ran at an annual level of 
about 1,150 million dollars', or some IL 9,000 millions at the formal 
rate of exchange. Assuming an average value added ratio of 50 per : 
cent - probably a close approximation of reality - the annual size 
of value added in industrial exports was thus of the order of 
IL 500 millions. The subsidy implied in the export credit facility 
thus amounts to some 10 per cent of the value added. An even much 
more striking importance of -the credit facility is found in the 
branch of polished diamonds, which has enjoyed' a particularly ample 
finance out of a special fund: a similar Calculation shows an implied 
subsidy of some 50 per cent on the value added in these exports.-
Such figures, it should be stressed, are only tentative illustrations; 
but they do point out that subsidization of; exports through cheap 
credit facilities has been of- some importance since the early 1960s, 
and has become particularly significant in recent years. 
(iii) Import Entitlement. ; Subsidies through import entitlements 
were instituted in one-form or another starting in the late 19^0s. At 
first, however, they were sporadic, non uniform, ahd relatively 
unimportant. - This may be explained, perhaps, by the predominance 
of exports of citrus fruit and polished diamonds, Israel's two 
traditional export items in those earlier years. Since almost all* 
the arrangements of this;nature confined import -entitlements to inputs 
which were "in the line of production" of the export industry, these 
two branches did not stand to gain by such, arrangements. Since these 
were strictly export industries, their inputs were never restricted. 
With the growing importance of exports of assorted manufacturing 
industries, the retention-quota plans grew in significance. In 
May 1953» the Pamaz 5/ plan - the major -form of the retention-quota 
5/ The term "Pamaz" is derived from the Hebrew initials for 
"foreign-currency deposits". This points to the origin of the 
arrangement, which at first (before 1953) was intended merely 
to provide the exporter with deposits of foreign exchange which 
were built up from his export proceeds and were meant to free 
him from the bureaucratic costs involved in requesting foreign-
exchange allocations to finance-his imported inputs. 
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system,- was established in its full-fledged fornj. -In this plan, 
all exporters;.(except those of citrus fruit and diamonds) were 
entitled to ,use all their export proceeds to buy; imports of materials 
in their "line of production"» Partly - in proportion to the import 
component in exports - these imports would be used for further 
production of,another "cycle" of exports.6/ The: other part, 
equivalent to the value added in exports, would thus be left for the 
purchase of imported inputs for production for the local market., 
Since at that time such imports were mostly restricted., whereas 
prices of the finished goods in the local market were already largely 
free, this import entitlement generated a quota profit. Since the 
imports of each exporter were confined to his '-'line of production" 
and Pamaz rights could not be transferred* the rates of extra profits 
differed, of course, from one industry to another.?/ 
The Pamaz arrangement reached its peak around 1956 and. then ! 
declined until it disappeared in 1959» This decline was partly by 
design- and partly due to changing circumstances. . The first factor 
which contributed to diminish the importance of the system was the 
introduction, in 1956, of general premiums. An exporter wishing to 
avail himself of the premium payment had to sell his foreign-exchange 
proceeds to. the Treasury, thus foregoing his Pamaz rights. Given-
this alternative,: many exporters opted for the premium rather than. 
6/ ' Vlhen exports were not stable but increasing, the exporter would 
get "credits" (in a book keeping sense) of foreign exchange, 
enabling him to finance the increased requirements for imported 
inputs. 
2/ In fact, the exporter was not forced to buy materials according 
to their proportions in his export production, but could 
concentrate his purchases as he saw fit. He could thus buy 
inputs and resell them to other industries in which he could.. 
obtain high prices for them. For instance, exporters of. 
chocolate and sî eets at one time used most -of their Pamaz-
rights to buy cellophane packaging paper, which was in large 
demand in the local market. If each industry uses many inputs, 
even in very small amounts,, it is likely that each such input 
can be bought by many industries. This would, in turn, tend 
to lower the profit differentials among industries from what 
they would have been if inputs were bought by each industry 
according to the weight of the inputs in production. 
/the Pamaz 
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the Pamaz right.8/ Another important influence in the- same direction 
was the process of gradual liberalization of imports of raw materials: 
obviously, Pamaz rights are of no significance when the needed inputs 
can be freely imported. ,In addition, from 1956 on, the government 
took a number of measures limiting the extent of Pamaz rightsi>9/ At 
the end of 1959» "the programme was abolished altogether» . :. 
Besides the general Pamaz plan, a few other import-entitlement 
arrangements existed, mainly during the late 1950s. These "linkage" 
rights were sporadic and confined to a few. specific industries; 
Exporters in those industries would be granted sin' import right in a 
specified ratio to the size of their exports (a ratio of one-to-one 
was quite common). Besides their sporadic nature, linkage 
arrangements differed from the Pamaz plan in two important.aspects. 
First, it will be recalled that the owner of a Pamaz right has to 
use part of this right to purchase imported inputs for his exports; 
the excess profits from sales on the local market would be derived, 
therefore, only from the value added in exports; The owner of a 
linkage right, on the other hand, would finance his imported inputs 
by buying foreign exchange from the Treasury, at the official rate, 
thus deriving excess profits from the total value of his exports. 
Second, the user of a Pamaz right had to forgo the government's 
direct export premium, whereas exporters who entered into a linkage 
8/ As the available data show, exporters rarely made on all-or-
none decision between the alternatives. Presumably, in each 
industry, exporters used their Pamaz rights to the point where, 
at the margin, extra profits fell to the level of premium 
payments, selling all the remainder to the Treasury at the 
premium rate. Since the number of exporting firms in each 
industry was usually small, thus giving some monopolistic 
position to each, a considerable gap might have often existed 
between the marginal-profit rate (equal to the premium) and 
the (higher) average rate. 
9/ For instance, exporters were required to sell part of their 
foreign-exchange proceeds to the Treasury, at the formal rate, 
as a counterpart to the value of the indirect import component 
used in the production process (which otherwise could be used 
to provide extra profits through Pamaz purchase's). Pamaz 
rights were also often lowered beyond this. 
/agreement could 
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agreement could sell their export proceeds to the government at the 
premium rate, thus enjoying both the premium a;nd the excess profits 
derived from imports, 
(iv) Branch Funds. Starting in 1959, and mainly since thé 
early 1960s, a number of so-called branch funds were established in 
a form designed primarily to encourage exports. The number of such 
funds was limited to fabout.seven or eight, but they related to 
quantitatively significant export industries (mainly in textiles). 
During the first half of the 1960s, before the réintroduction of 
general premiums, branch funds were the main source of export subsidies, 
although they were applied to only certain segments of exports. Each 
branch fund had its own unique structure and method of operation. 
In general the method of export subsidization through thei funds was 
a combination of governmental premium and compensation through sales 
of restricted imports in the local market. But to some extent, the 
funds were merely cartel arrangements, backed by the government, which 
allocated sales among the local and foreign-markets. 
Other Promotion Measures. In the category of indirect export-
promotion policies, the most important has undoubtedly been 
encouragement of investment in exports. Investment activity in 
Israel has all throughout been prompted to a large extent by 
government grants, cheap long-term credits, income-tax concessions, 
provision of cheap land, and a few other measures. Export activity 
has always been prominent among the criteria entitling potential 
investors to such facilities. It is very difficult to estimate the 
effectiveness of such investment provisions oh exports, for several 
reasons : export activity is only one of the attributes required for 
favourable treatment - and is by no means a necessary condition; even 
when required, it is only some export activity which has to be 
promised - almost regardless of size: and, not least important, no 
checking of performance is conducted by the government once the 
investment project is under way. While some professed attributes 
of a project (such as the locality of a plant) cannot bé easily 
/circumvented, the 
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circumyented, the profession of the intention to engage in export 
activity becomes of a very limited significance where no follow-up 
is carried out or expected-
..Other indirect export-promotion measures are of a lesser 
importance. The^e have included aid in market research, organization 
of trade fates and other facilities of dissemination of information, 
and various other measures of a similar nature. 
•̂• Effective Exchange Rates in Exports 
In principle, all forms of export-promotion schemes might.be 
quantified; and would then be best expressed as c.omponents of the 
effective exchange rate of exports. - one component of which would 
always be, of course, the formal exchange rate which applies to 
export transactions. This has been done here only for the major 
(and more amenable to measurement) scheme applied in the Israeli 
experience, namely, the premium scheme (in its varying nature over 
time). The premiums per value added (whether or not at was so granted 
explicitly) has been calculated; and adding it to the formal rate of 
exchange yields the effective rate of exchange for value added in 
exports. This rate.is shown in table 2, for exports of goods (i.e.* 
excluding exports of services). , • • : 
It appears from.table 2 . that, by and large, major changes in 
the effective exchange.,rate for exports took place when.formal 
devaluations occurred (in 1952t195^ 1962, end of 1967, 1971, 197^, 
and 1975). But the premium schemes have worked to make changes in 
the effective exchange rate much more gradual than they would have 
been without it. In between formal devaluations, the subsidy rate 
has tended to increase gradually; whereas with formal acts of 
devaluations the subsidy rate has usually been lowered, sometimes 
drastically, to make the change in the effective rate for exports 
considerably less than the change in the formal rate of exchange. 
As a rule, the effective exchange rate for value added in 
exports has been lower than the. equivalent rate in import substitution. 
/Estimation of 
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Estimation of the latter is subject to many difficulties, and has 
therefore not been carried out in a systematic manner; but all the 
available evidence confirms the impression that;the import rate has 
indeed been higher than the export rate. Thus, data for the years 
I956-I96O, for over 50 industrial branches, show the average import 
rate to be about 30 to 50 per cent higher than the average export 
rate.10/ Similarly, the effective rate of protection appears, in a 
study conducted by J. Baruch for 1965, to be 66 per cent for domestic 
sales and only 10 per cent for export sales 11/ (1965, it should be 
reminded, is one of the few years in which no general export premium 
scheme was in force). Studies of individual industries give similar 
indications. Also, the very existence of import restrictions implies 
protection for imports. Had quota profits in imports been estimated 
adequately, they could in principle be added to the effective 
exchange rate (or the effective protection rate) in import 
substitution. But in fact this procedure has not been usually 
followed in the estimation of effective rate, so that in the comparison 
of rates in exports and in import substitution the latter is under-
estimated - a fact which re-inforces the impression of the existence 
of lower effective rates in exports than in imports. In that sense, 
therefore.̂  exports have usually been discriminated against, despite 
the apparent existence of export-promotion measures. 
Within exports, the degree of discrimination in the system has 
not been considerable: the.premium schemes have been applied, by and 
large, to most exports in a:'fairly universal manner. It is true 
that other export-promotion schemes (such,as import entitlement) 
imply a'much more diversified system of .promotion. The absence of 
the impact of such schemes from the estimates of effective exchange 
rates of exports (which, it should be recalled* add only,the subsidy 
rate in the premium-scheme to the.formal rate of exchange) thus 
10/ See Michaely (1975), täble 4-5, p. 97. 
2/ Joseph Baruch, The Structure of Protection in Israel, 1965 and 
1968. Jerusalem, Bank>öf Israel, 1976 (in Hebrew). ^ ~~ 
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tends.to lower the apparent degree of diversification in the system. 
But the bias involved is not too strong, due to the major role 
played by the premium scheme within the general system of export 
promotion. 
So far as major export groupings are concerned, deviations 
- again, not very substantial - from the average effective exchange 
rates in exports may be seen mainly in the two traditional export 
categories, citrus fruits and polished diamonds, and in textiles.-
Effective exchange rates for value added for these major groups 
during the period up to 1970 are presented in table 3. 
Until the mid-1950s, apparently, none of the three majbr export 
categories covered in the table,was systematically discriminated 
against or treated.with special favour. From that time until the 
1962 devaluation, diamonds received the prevailing rate for industrial 
exports (IL 2.65 per dollar), exports of citrus fruits received;a 
lower rate, and textiles, a higher one. From the time of the 1962 
devaluation until 1965, when export premiums were as a rule non-existent, 
exports of textiles received a favourable treatment. From 1966.on, 
with the reintroduction of general export premiums, the favourable 
treatment of textiles was reinforced, but both diamonds and citrus 
fruits were discriminated against relative to other exports - the 
former.more.than the latter. These two ¡traditional exports, it may 
be recalled, did not (and could not, by their nature) enjoy the 
benefits of the Pamaz (retention-quota) plan of the. 1950s or other 
forms of compensation through the local market. It may thus be 
assumed that in comparison with other exports, these two have been 
discriminated against during most of the period since the mid-1950s. 
The special favourable rate for textiles has been part of an 
overall effort to encourage the growth of that industry, which was 
judged by the government to be most suitable for the newly established 
towns in Israel, in the framework of a general policy meant to 
encourage the dispersion of population. The discrimination against 
citrus fruits and diamond exports was due, most probably, to both 
demand and supply considerations.. In these two industries (and only 
/in these 
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in these two, among export categories) Israel has a significant share 
of the world market. Consequently, foreign demand for Israel's 
exports of goods in these two categories is probably less elastic 
than in others. In the citrus industry, but not in diamonds, supply 
factors are also involved: since local consumption absorbs only a 
minor share of the country's production (some 20 to 25 per cent), 
and the gestation period of, investment in plantations is quite long, 
the short-term supply of exports is rather inelastic. In the short 
run, then, high export premiums for citrus products would largely 
constitute a rent, while their impact qn the government's budget 
- due to the size of .these, exports - would be significant. Short-
term supply considerations - and it may be suspected that the 
government's considerations in this area were primarily of short-
run nature - thus were an added, argument against granting high 
exchange rates to the citrus industry. It may well be. that the lack 
of discrimination against this industry until the mid-1950s was at 
least partly due to a higher supply elasticity in those years-. 
During World War II and again during the War of Independence, a very 
large fraction of the citrus plantations was badly damaged. Some 
plantations could not be restored; but in others, yields could be 
increased fast by investment in restoration of the trees as well as 
by introduction of modern techniques. Profits could, therefore, at 
that time have a substantial impact even on short-term supply.12/ 
The effective exchange rates for polished diamonds, as shown 
in table 3, are most probably biased downward in, comparison 
with rates in other branches. For a variety of reasons, polished 
diamonds have most often been given encouragement by specific 
measures, other than the premiums scheme. These have usually 
been of a vague nature, and not' subject to measurement. Examples 
are a lax.treatment of diamond-polishing firms in income-tax 
calculations, or a benign form of foreign-exchange cop-trol, 
which has enabled firms to increase profits by either selling 
or.buying, as the case may be, in the black market for foreign 
exchanged 
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5. The Effectiveness of Export Policy '•„••. 
In the present discussion, "export policy" will be represented 
by the single index of the effective exchange rate for exports» The 
question to be discussed-will be, hence: to what extent have, changes 
in the effective rate been influential on export performance? 
This, -question may be sub-divided into two. , First, we may 
inquire to what extent have changes in the effective rate led to 
parallel changes in the relative price of exports. Only inasmuch as 
changes in the exchange rate lead to a relative increase in the 
price of exports, ,,in comparison with domestic .prices in the economy,-
could they be expected to promote exports at the expense of.other 
sectors in the economy. Second, assuming that a change in.the ' 
relative price of exports does take place, we may inquire ;to.what 
extent such a change, does indeed have an impact on export performance. 
. Column. (3) in table 2 above is.designed to deal with the first 
question: the Pu.rchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) .- adjusted effective 
rate is the indicator of the relative, change in the price of exports. 
Beside the .change .in the effective, exchange rate, it takes into 
account changes in the foreign-exchange price of exports; and changes 
in domestic prices. The relative price of exports increases with 
increases in the former two (the effective rate and the world price 
of exports); and decreases with an increase in the latter magnitude 
(the level of domestic prices).13/ It appears, that during the period 
of major devaluation 1952-1954» the PPP-adjusted effective rate also 
increased considerably, although not quite as much as the unadjusted 
13/ Let É denote the change in the PPP-adjusted effective, exchange 
rate (column (3) in table 2). Then: 
A (1 + É) (1 + W) E = ______________ - where: 
(1 + H) 
. R - change in the effective, exchange rate; 
tô'='• change in world ( fôr'eign-exchange) price of exports; and 
H = change in the level of domestic price. 
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rate: substantial rises of domestic prices during those years worked 
to offset only part of the increase in the exchange rate. The more 
modes.t increases of the. effective rate during the following three 
years 1955-1957, which were carried out mainly by the use of the 
premium scheme, likewise led to almost equivalent increases in the • 
PPP-adjusted rate. From 1958 onward, however, the co-movement of 
the two. rates ceases. For nearly a decade, the trend of the adjusted 
rate was slightly downward while the unadjusted rate moved slightly 
upward. Even in 1962, when the unadjusted effective rate increased 
by 13 per cent (and the formal rate by 6? per cent!), the adjusted 
exchange rate increased by only less than 3 per cent. During the 
last decade, 1966-1975, the adjusted rate has moved again upward, 
but to a much smaller extent than the unadjusted rate: the average . 
increase of the former during this period was about 3«5 per cent, 
in comparispn with an average increase of 11.5 per cent of the 
unadjusted rate.. Substantial increases in domestic prices, particularly 
in most recent years, . which have far exceeded increases ̂ n world 
prices of Israel's exports, have worked to make the increase in-the 
relative price of exports very modest despite the frequent use of 
formal devaluations and substantial increases in the subsidy granted 
by the premium scheme. 
The second issue, of the impact of changes in the relative 
price of exports on export performance, may best be coined in terms 
of the elasticity of supply of exports. The main study of this aspect 
of the Israeli experience ha§ been carried out by -Nadav Halevi.14/ 
Halevi's study is concerned with both aggregate exports of goods, and, 
more particularly, with industrial exports (excluding diamonds), 
which since the late 1950s constitute the major category of exports, 
and are presumably more sensitive to price changes than any of the 
14/ Nadav Halevi, "Devaluation, Relative Prices, and Exports in 
Israel", in Nadav Halevi and Michael Michaely, eds., Studies 
in Israel's Foreign Trade. Jerusalem: Falk Institute and 
Hebrew University 1972 (in Hebrew). ' 
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other export categories of goods.15/ Value added in exports, at . 
constante prices, is shown in this study as a function of the 
relative price of exports (that is, the adjusted effective exchange 
rate for value added in exports) and the size of capital, which is 
taken as an "indicator of productive capacity. For total exports of 
goods, the PPP-adjusted exchange rate, like the earlier figures 
shown, is based on domestic prices of GNP; and the capital variable 
used is aggregate capital stock in the economy. For the period 
1955-1969j the relative-price elasticity of the supply of exports 
as obtained from the function is 0.50 (with an R of .970). For 
industrial exports alone, the capital variable used is the capital 
stock in industry; and in the PPP adjustment, two alternative 
domestic price levels are employed: GNP prices and the level of 
industrial prices. The former alternative yields a higher elasticity 
of supply than the latter, and both values are higher than the 
elasticity found for total exports of goods. When the price variable 
is the PPP-adjusted effective exchange rate for industrial exports, 
in which GNP prices are utilized, the elasticity of supply of 
industrial exports is found to be 1.19 (R is .987) and when local 
15/ The two other major categories are agricultural exports and 
•polished diamonds. The production cycle of diamond polishing 
is quite short (probably not longer than five or six weeks), 
and the size of production could change quite rapidly, both 
because of technical facilities and because the proportion of 
permanent workers in the labour,force is particularly low in 
this industry. The responsiveness of exports (which in this 
industry in Israel are practically identical with production) 
to price changes may therefore be expected to be relatively 
strong. But, unlike most of Israel's other industrial exports, 
its exports of polished diamonds constitute a large share of 
the world market; and demand in this market is very volatile. 
Exports..of diamonds is thus heavily affected by fluctuations 
of foreign demand, only part of which is presumably reflected 
in changes in the foreign price of exports. Likewise,. ., 
monopolistic restrictions in the market for raw diamonds are 
important in the determination of Israel's production of 
polished diamonds at any given time. If such factors could 
be accounted for, the price elasticity of supply of this 
export category would probably have been found to be (concl.) 
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industrial prices are used, the supply elasticity is 0.87 (R is 
.980). Halevi also attempts a distributed-lag model, to introduce 
the possibility of responsiveness to relative price changes which 
stretches beyond a single year. In the regression fitted, about two-
thirds of the total adjustment is found to take place over the first 
year following the price change. The supply elasticity thus obtained 
using the industrial-prices variant in the- PPP adjustment, is 
1.3^ - considerably higher than the figure of 0.8? reached in the 
simple, nonlagged regression. ' 
From Halevi's estimates, it appears that the supply elasticity 
of exports is substantial, and probably even high. This: impres.sion 
is strengthened by the realization that these, estimates must, for a 
number of reasons, be biased downward. It should be noted, first, 
that the estimates exclude the first half of the 1950s, when the 
exchange-rate changes were not only: at thei.r strongest but appear to 
have had relatively the strongest impact: slight variations.in the 
exchange rate result in lower estimates of elasticities (of supply 
or demand) than major price changes, because of errors in measurement. 
(concl.) high; but this is only a presumption whose verification 
would require an elaborate study. 
A somewhat similar problem is found in agricultural products: 
the random factor introduced by weather conditions complicates 
the identification of responses to price changes. But more 
important in this case is the effect of the long time lag 
involved in such response. Citrus fruits constitute the largest 
share of exports in this category; and the gestation period 
(from planting to first marketable yield) of investment in 
citrus fruit is at least six years. Thus, it would be unwarranted 
to expect that a change in the exchange rate in one year would 
be sufficient to induce a significantly large new planting. 
Even if it were, the result would not show up in the export 
figure's until many years later. Also, price changes could only 
slightly' affect the allocation of a current crop between the 
local and the foreign markets since almost all the fruit which 
is technically exportable (being free of deficiencies) is 
exported. Hence, annual observations of price and quantity 
of exports of citrus fruit could hardly be expected to reveal 
any positive supply elasticity. 
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Likewise, the use of annual averages, which inherently incorporate 
errors in measurement, tends to lower the estimates of the 
elasticities.- No less important is the time lag involved in the 
response of quantity to price. The use of a distributed-lag model 
partly solves this difficulty, but does not eliminate it altogether. 
Thus, Halevi finds a very high elasticity of supply (roughly, 2) of 
industrial exports in relation to the change in capital stock. It 
may be assumed that the bias toward exports in the process of growth 
of capital stock, which is-indicated by this elasticity, is itself 
at least partly a reaction to. earlier changes.in relative prices in 
favour of exports. If this is true, part .of the quantity reaction 
to relative price changes would be disguised, even in a distributed-
lag model, as a response to changes in capital stock.16/ The 
existence of all these biases would suggest that Halevi*s estimates 
of ;supply elasticities of Israel's exports may be taken as the lower 
limit pf the true size of these elasticities. It may thus be 
concluded .that export responsiveness in Israel to export promotion 
policies, when these result in actual changes in the relative price 
of exports, has indeed been substantial. 
16/ In a recent preliminary paper, Razin and Zuckeirman point out 
another downward bias, due to an identification problem resulting 
from the possibility that the effective rate itself is changed 
by the government in response to the country's balance-of-
payments position. They argue that the removal of this bias 
would have increased substantially the elasticities of supply 
estimated by Halevi. .Assaf Razin and Alex Zuckeirman, "On the 
Interdependence of Exchange-Rate Policy and Exports and Imports", 
.. Working Paper 76-39, Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv 
University, July 19 ̂6 (in Hebrew). 
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6» Export Growth and Import Substitution 
It is interesting to investigate to what extent has the country's 
economic performance - at least partly due to export-promotion policies 
and the foreign-exchange regime in general - been biased towards 
exports versus import substitution.. In Israel's case, where the 
economy started out with an extremely large import surplus, a most 
appropriate means of answering this question would be to determine 
how much of the reduction of the import surplus was achieved by 
reducing imports and how much by increasing exports. This would 
provide an indication of whether the country ' s growth" process ̂ was 
biased towards or against foreign trade. 
Table k contains estimates of value added in exports (column 3) 
and imports for domestic use (column 5), obtained by assuming that 
thé amount of each will be in the same ratio to GNP in the current 
year as it actually was in the preceding year. The figures in 
columns 2 and k are the actually observed values of these aggregates. 
The excess of actual exports over their- "expected" value is a 
contribution to the reduction of the ratio of the import surplus to 
GNP; and the opposite is, of course, true of imports. These 
contributions are presented in columns 6 and 7 in absolute amounts 
and in columns 8 and 9 as ratios to GNP.17/ 
It appears from these figures that the period can be divided 
into three subperiods: the 1950s up to and including 1959; the 1960s 
and early 1970s up to and including 1971; and the recent years 
1972-1975. In the 1950s, most of the contribution to the relative 
reduction of the import surplus came from the import side; the 
contribution due to the rise of exports was also positive, but much 
less significant in size. The dominance of imports in their impact 
17/ In principle, the summation of the export and import figures 
of columns 8 and 9 for each year should yield the same result 
as the year-to-year changes which may be derived from column 1. 
The slight differences between the two are due- to rounding. 
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on the development of the import surplus was, however, simply due 
to their overwhelming size in comparison with exports. ' In relation 
to their own size, as is shown by the data in columns 10 and 11, the 
contributions of exports and imports to the decline of the imports 
surplus were quite similar - even slightly higher in exports than 
in imports. , In this period, then, both exports and imports were 
involved in the process of reducing the import surplus. 
During the 1960s, the relative increase in exports continued 
as before. The contribution of exports to the relative reduction 
of the import surplus was, on average, in the same ratio to the 
national product as it was in the 1950s. However, since the relative 
size of exports was gradually increasing, this meant a lower ratio 
of exports themselves, as may be seen in column 10. Imports^ on the 
other hand, exhibited a: relative rise; that is, they contributed to 
an increase of the import surplus rather than to its reduction. This 
trend was not as substantial as the opposite trend of the 1950s, but 
its existence cannot be doubted: from 1959 to 1971* imports "rose over 
the increase which would have maiiitained the ratio of imports to GNP 
constant from year to year by about 6 per cent of GNP; or, put in a 
different way, the relative annual increase of imports over this 
period ("average of the 1960-1971 figures in column 11) was about 
2 per cent of imports. 
During the years 1972-1975» the relative size of the import 
-surplus increased substantially. Most of this increase took place 
in 1973« and is undoubtedly related to the war of October 1973 
(though, it should be noted, direct imports for military use are 
excluded from the import and import-surplus data of table 4). During 
this period exports did not contribute to a redubtion of the import 
surplus - they maintained a roughly constant proportion of the GNP. 
But in view of the fact that an increase of imports contributed to 
a substantial deterioration of the import surplus, the constancy of 
the relative size of exports may still be termed a development which 
is biased in favour of exports versus import substitutes. 
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The performance of exports during the 1950s was in line with 
the trend that would be expected in view of the movement of PLD-EERs 
for exports: an increase of exports accompanying a sharp rise of 
export rates. As with imports, the continued rise of exports in the 
late 1950s could possibly be explained by the rise of export rates a 
few years earlier: the latter rose sharply until 195^, and then 
mildly until 1957» The persistent rise of exports during the 1960s, 
however, can by no means be explained by price changes: just as with 
imports, the level of export rates was not rising during this period. 
It might be argued that the continued rise of exports in the 1960s 
was still a lagged effect of the rate increases of the 1950s, But 
this is most doubtful, on two ground's. First, it is unlikely that 
events of this kind would still be influential three to as long as 
fifteen (!)'year later. And second, if'thé effect of the rate had 
persisted over this long period, it should have been reflected in 
imports as well as in exports, since there is no apparent reason 
for it to do otherwise. 
It appears that a distinction should bë made between levels 
of protection of exports and import substitutes and movements of 
these levels. There seems to be no doubt that, even in the late 
1960s and, early 1970s, the level of protection afforded by the 
exchange system was considerably higher for import substitutes than, 
for exports. In this sense, the government's policy, as expressed 
in the exchange system, has been biased toward import substitution. 
When policy changes over the years are considered, on the other 
hand, it appears that exports and import substitutes were similarly 
encouraged during the 1950s. In the 1960s, the direction of policy 
change must have been biased toward exports: the growth process was 
biased toward trade..18/ This is probably explained, at least in 
part, by nonprice elements in the trade and exchange system. The 
A bias toward trade development is indicated also in Halevi, 
"Devaluation", op.cit.; and. Jirnmi Weinblat, "The Effect of the 
Effective Exchange Rate on Imports: 1950-1967", Studies in 
Israel's Foreign Trade, op,cit. 
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6light relative increase in imports during these years, with rather 
stable EERs (as they are actually estimated), may possibly be due 
to the gradual relaxation of quantitative restrictions on imports, 
which during the 1950s had provided an added motivation for import 
substitution, particularly of finished consumer goods. Similarly, 
measures taken by the government in its budgetary and long-term 
credit policies to direct investments toward export industries may 
provide an explanation of the growth of exports, during the 1960s, 
in addition to the encouragement resulting from relative changes 
in the exchange rate. Also, the relaxation of import restrictions, 
and the reduction of protection of import substitutes, must have 
had an impact on exports just as well as on imports - in opposite 
directions, of course: reduced protection of import substitutes 
discourages these branches; but, by the same token, it gives relative 
encouragement to export branches. 
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SUBSIDY RATES IN THE' PREMIUM SCHEME' FOR EXPORTS, 






































' ' (5) 
April 1966 ;0.09 - 0.15 3.00 5.0 
November 1966 0.22 — 0.33 11.0 
March 1967 O.3O - 0.50 , 1.6.7 
November 1967 Ö.27 — • O.45 3.50 I2.9 
February 1970 O.45 - 0.75 21.4 
August 1970 0.98 0.70 1.17 33»^ 
January 1971 I.O6 I.30 37.I 
August 1971 O.89 0.84 O.91 4.20 21.7 
January 1972 0.99 I.08 25.7 
January 1973 1.13 I .32 31.4 
August 1973 1.19 1.42 33.8 
November 1973 1.40 1.05 I.63 38.8 
July 1974 1.82 1.47 1.88 44.8 
November 1974 1.28 O.90 1.53 6.00 25.5 
January 1975 1.64 2.13 35.5 
April 1975 1.74 2.30 38.3 
May 1975 1.78 2.37 39.5 
June 1975 I.80 O.92 2.38 6.12 38.9 
August 1975 I.80 0.94 2.37 6.24 38.0 
September 1975 I.80 0.96 2.35 6.36 37.0 
September 1975 I.80 I.05 2.30 7.OO 32.9 
November 1975 I.80 1.07 2.28 7.IO 32.1 
Source: Data from Michaely (1975), table 4-2, p. 88; and from Bank of 
Israel, Annual Report 1975« table IV-17. For method see text. 
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Table 2 




Year Exchange Rate Change from Change in (IL per dollar) Previous PPP-Adjusted 
Year Rate 
(1) (2) (3) 
1949 0.35 
1950 . 0.39 9.4 0 0 
1951 O.kl 5.7 3.0 
1952 0.81 98.3 32.0 
1953 1.28 58.1 16.9 
195^ • 1.73 35.3 27.0 
1955 1.83 5.8 . 5.0 
1956 2.05 12.1 7.1 
1957 2.21 7.8 7.0 
1958 . 2.37 7.2 -3.3 
1959 2.49 5.0 -1.7 
I960 2.58 3.6 1.7 
1961 2.66 3.1 -6.4 
1962 a/ 3.00 13.0 2.7 
1963 3.04 0.7 -4.9 1964 3.06 0.7 -3-3 
1965 3.08 0.7 -5.8 . 
1966 3.27 6.1 1.0 
1967 3.57 9.1 6.1 
1968 4.04 13 = 1 9.5 
1969 if.05 0.2 2.2 
1970 4.49 10.7 2.2 
1971 a/ 5.04 12.2 0.4 
4.90 
1972 5o28 7.8 0.0 
1973 5.58 5.7 3.3 
1974 6.20 11.1 5.5 
1975 8.60 38.7 3.9 
Source: For 1949-1971 - Michaeli (1975), tables 5-1 and 5-6. For 
1972-1975 - data in table 1 of the present paper. It should 
be noted that these data apply to one value-added category 
only, and rest on partly-arbitrary assumptions. 
a/ Due to changes in sources and methods, two rates are shown in 




SELECTED EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS, 1949-1970 
(Israeli pounds per dollar of value added) 






1 9 4 9 O o 3 4 O o 3 9 0 . 3 5 0 . 3 5 
1 9 5 0 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 7 0 . 3 9 
1 9 5 1 0 . 4 1 O o 4 2 O o 3 7 O o 4 1 
1 9 5 2 0 . 7 6 O o 9 5 0 . 82 O o 81 
1 9 5 3 1 . 22 1 . 20 1 . 2 6 1 . 28 
1 9 5 4 1 . 80 l o 4 7 1 . 80 1 . 7 3 
1 9 5 5 l o 8 0 l o 8 7 l o 8 0 l o 8 3 
1 9 5 6 1 . 8 0 2 o 4 0 2 o 3 3 2 . 0 5 
1 9 5 7 l o 80 2 o 6 5 2 = 6 5 2 o 2 1 
1 9 5 8 2 . 0 5 2 o 6 5 2 . 6 6 2 o 3 7 
1 9 5 9 2 o 1 6 2 = 6 5 2 » 8 3 2 o 4 9 
I 9 6 0 2 o 3 0 2 o 6 5 2 o 7 5 2 o 5 8 
1 9 6 1 2 . 4 9 2. 6 5 2 . 9 2 2 o 66 
1962 a/ 3 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 3 - 1 8 3 . 0 5 
1963 a/ 3 . 0 0 3 » 0 0 3 » 1 8 3 » 0 5 
1 9 6 4 a/ 3 » 0 0 3 o 0 0 3 " 1 8 3 . 0 5 " 
1965 a/ . 3 . 0 0 3 » 0 0 3 » 1 8 3. 0 5 , 
1 9 6 6 3 o 1 1 3 o 0 0 4 . 4 4 3 . 2 7 
1 9 6 7 3 o 23 3 ° 0 8 5 o 7 6 3 . 5 7 
1 9 6 8 3 o 94 3 = 50 5 - 7 9 4 . 0 4 
1 9 6 9 3 o 9 5 3 o 50 5 » 8 4 4 o 0 5 
1 9 7 0 4 o 2 7 3 » 7 9 6. 1 8 4 o 4 9 
Source: Michaely (1975), table 4-10. 
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in Exports b/ 
Imports for 


















Expected Exports Imports Imports_ Exports__ __Imports 
d/ ¿(2) less (327 ZT5) less (k}7 ¿(6)/GUP/ /(7)/GN^ Z(6)/(3j/ /(7)/(5j/ 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1950 42.5 38 504 
1951 43.8 48 50 677 660 
1952 32.5 . 64 52 . 565 727 
1953 25.9 80 65 k8k 571 
195*t 19.5 124 97 496 590 
1955 20.6 117 139 557 556 
1956 21.1 154 127 642 605 
195? 22.2 185 167 747 700 
1958 19.3 200 202 733 816 
1959 14.6 247 225 704 830 
I960 13.8 320 267 788 761 
1961 15o4 359 355 937 872 
1962 13.4 477 405 1 043 1 058 
1963 11.2 563 533 1 089 1 165 
1964- I6.I 560 619 1 396 1 202 
1965 I3.7 646 599 1 4o8 1 491 
1966 11.5 708 659 1 360 1 437 
1967 8.6 772 717 1 266 1 377 
1968 11.4 936 876 1 682 1 439 




















-17 -0.1 -1.2 -4.0 -2.6 
+162 +0.8 +10.5 +23.I +22.3 
+87 +1.0 +5.6 +23.I +15.2 
+94 +1.4 +4.9 +27.8 +15.9 
-1 -1.0 0.0 -15.8 -0.2 
-37 +1.2 "1.6 +21.3 - 6 . 1 
-47 +0.7 ^-1.9 +10.8 -6.7 
+83 -0.1 ' +3.0 -1.0 +10.2 
+126 +0.7 +4.0 +9.8 +15.2 
-27 +1.6 1 ° -1 .0 +19.9 -3.5 
-65 +0.1 "1.7 +1.1 -7«5 
+15 +1.7 +0.4 +17.8 +1.4 
+76 +0.6 +1.6 +5.6 +6.5 
-194 -1.1 -3.7 -9 .5 -16.1 
+83 +0.8 +1.5 +7.8 +5.6 
+77 +0.9 +1.4 +7.4 +5.4 
+111 +1.0 +1.9 +7.7 +8.1 
-243 +0.9 -3.7 +6.8 -16.9 
-157 =lo3 -2.1 -9.3 -8 .3 
/Table 4 (conci.) 













Domestic Use b/ 
Contribution to 
















¿(2) less (3J/ 
(6) 
Imports 














1 017 2 368 2 184 +129 -184 +1.6 -2.3 +12.7 -8.4 
1 247 2 415 2 575 +368 +160 +4.3 +1.9 +29.5 +6.2 
1 777 2 655 2 657 -26 +2 -0.3 +0.02 -1.5 +0.1 
1 848 3 241 2 8o6 -43 -435 -0.4 -4.4 -2.3 -15.5 
1 931 3 324 3 46l -16 +137 -0.2 +1.3 -0.8 +4.0 













Source: For 1950-1972 
Report, 1975 
- Michaely, table 6-8. For 1972-1975 - Extrapolations based on data drawn from Bank of Israel, Annual 
In these extrapolations, the 1972 ratio of value added to gross value of exports was applied arbitrarily 






For details o 
Excludes imports 
f construction and sources, see accompanying text, 
of military goods. 
Obtained by substracting the import component in exports from both exports and imports. 
Positive sign denotes contribution to relative improvement of the surplus; negative sign, deterioration. 
Assuming it was jin the same ratio to GNP as in the previous year. 

